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Law as struggle
RAJEEV DRA VAN

Discussions about Law in India have always had a sense of incompleteness about
them. Such discussions are regarded as necessary but esoteric because law is an important
form of governmental expression; but esoteric because it is supposedly meant for lawyers.
Pandit Nehru who played a somewhat less prominent role in the day to day discussions on
the making of India's Constitution, referred to the Constitution as something made by
lawyers. Later, after the Supreme Court had invalidated agrarian legislation, he felt that
lawyers "had purloined the Constitution."
Nothing could be more fascinating than a
systemattic analysis of how the 'law' gets purloined. But, by and large, discussions about
law treat it as an object rather than a subject of discussion. It is treated as something out
there made by civil servants and parliament and relied on by lawyers, in their black coats,
to win or lose cases in courts. Against this distant view of 'law' contrasts' peoples,
experience of law. Experiences of awesome treatment at the hands of the police,
experiences involving rape whilst in custody, or brutal beatings in jail, experiences of
lawyers charging fees on scales that are oppressive and absurd, and experience of delays in
law suits of poor cultivators who walk miles to attend courts hearings only to discover
that it has been adjourned once again, experiences, in other words of 'law', legal personnel
and legal institutions as a part of their oppression.
A major problem has been the sense of resignation with which these two perceptions
have been kept apart. Till recently, neither the government, nor the courts, nor
scholarship, nor-indeed-the public or the victims of law have tried to merge these two
ways of looking at law with any sense of purpose or integrity. The formal view of law
lives in public handouts, as statutes, in the proclaimed majesty of the law, in law reports
and in most legal discourse. The Universities are obsessed by the formal view of law; and
a veritable industry of text book publishers have created a lucrative market of practitioners
and student texts. Much of the work of the Law Commission has been· concerned with
this formal view of the law. From time to time, the Law Commission "tides up" the law,
occasionally as in the case of the recent Law Commission chaired by Dhirubhai Desaistraying into seeing the Law as people feel and suffer it. The experiential view of law has
been edged out of the main stream discussion about law. The main technique by which
this has been done is to make the old distinction between the rule and its distorted
application. It is argued that the law is fine, but unfortunately distorted by society. This
argument accepts that distortions exist but regards the central problem as one of the
devising ways and means of ensuring that the distortions are eliminated.
2. The

Planning

Commission's

instrumental

view

of law

I will call this view of crossing the gap between formal law and experiential law as
the Planning Commission view. The Planning Commission in India is committed to this
view. With few notable exceptions, the Planning Commission strongly put forward this
view in series of reports on land reforms. These have all been admirably reviewed and
critiques in P.C. Joshi's Land Reforms in India. But it has also been suggested in many
other contexts, including food and drugs legislation and socio-economic offences. The
essence of this approach is the creation of powerful regulatory bureaucracies which will
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take initiatives to ensure that the gap between law and society is crossed. It is - in many
cases - supported by a plea for a harsh criminal law and public education. The harsh
criminal law is for those who subvert the objectives of the legislation. Public education
is for people to know of their rights and assert them in, and through, the agencies
earmarked for implementing the law. This is not just the approach to the enforcement of
legislation dealing with social, economic and welfare matters. It is also a view taken more
generally about the law. If there are an excess of cases filed in court, the remedy proposed
is to limit the jurisdiction of the courts, (as suggested during the Emergency), create more
courts (as in Administrative Tribunals or, for that matter, nyaya panchayats or 10k adalats)
or create more judges. So when it is pointed out that ordinary people are finding it
difficult to get justice, it is said that this is because the present government has not
appointed enough judges. At this point, the discussion drifts into party politics; but,
never straying away from the Planning Commission view that the answer lies in more
bureaucracy, more institutions, more man power, more stringent criminal laws simply
more. The Planning Commission approach can also be called the instrumental approach
because it seeks to instrument change by bureaucratic and other allied and ancillary
methods. There are many difficulties with the Planning Commission view. It is as formal
as the formal law whose deficiencies it seeks to correct. The institutions created under the
Planning Commission
or instrumental approach are themselves ignored, abused,
differentially appropriated, corrupted and de-instrumented from their main purpose. But,
the Planning Commission approach has a further answer to this problem. This consists
of creating further institlitions and laws. Some of the these further institutions are
vigilance and anti-corruption institutions; others strive to create more institutions and
processes. Changes in the law are proposed so that the conviction of a socio-economic
offender, or rapist or drug peddler is made easier. More instruments are created, those that
exist are streamlined. The quest of bureaucratic solutions continues to provide perfect
paper remedies with often, hopelessly imperfect results.
There is danger of my being completely misunderstood if read into my comments is
an implicit iconoclastic suggestion that the entire edifice on which the instrumental view
of law is founded should be immediately dismantled. It is just important to remember that
the instrumental view is profoundly skewed. It has imperfections of design and results. To
treat is as an exclusive approach would be dangerous; even though the government often
claims exclusivity for its instrumental efforts, sometimes not just be-Iitting and delegitimating alternative efforts and solutions but actually invalidating and criminalizing
them.
The instrumental view treats its beneficiaries as an object. It over-simplifies the·
society in which these objects live. It provides them remedies that they can never have the
resources and courage to use. They provide solutions which the greedy and powerful
capture. It does not recognise the essential truth that it is law (including legal solutions
legal institutions and legal processes) which is a part of society; not, society which is an
addendum to law. What is central to people is what is happening to their lives. No doubt
law circumscribes their predicament. On the other hand the advantaged who appropriate
the Law and the use of legal institutions (whether by direct corruption or effective use)
treat law as part of their social strategy; not as objects of law seeking, necessarily, to act
within it. They strive to, bend, interpret, manipulate, take over, discredit and change the
law-often, by fair means or foul. Those who are the victims of law view it as another
social instruments by which their lives are ruined and their person and persons treated
with disrespect. Where the law is used against them it is an instrument of oppression

which is for them (and, in many cases, even objectively assessed) experientially
indistinguishable, from other forms of oppression. Where it is intended for their benefit,
it remains remote, often un-heard of, difficult to mobilize and, generally impossible.
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The instrumental view of law poses very difficult problems for the disadvantaged and
those who serve the cause of the disadvantaged. What exactly do they do with the law?
Accept it? Can they really reject it? Will the law leave them alone? What are the
alternative before them? These questions have to be asked and answered not is a theoretical
way, but as part of practical decision making. The theoretical discussions are important. If
the Law is an instrument of class oppression, it seems silly to get caught in its tentacles;
and, it is necessary to expose it for what it is. However, practice has important lessons to
teach theory about adjudging the predicament of people as it actually exists at any given
point in time; and, devising theoretical perspectives and strategies mindful of this
predicament

3. Can modern Indian law be avoided by the disadvantaged
If one of the choices faced by activists is the avoidance of law, it is important to
consider whether modem law can be avoided. When I speak of modem law, I speak of law
as the formal expression of the State along with the innumerous instrumentalities and
functionaries associated with its application and instrumentation. What distinguishes
modern law from its traditional counterpart is the sheer expense of its putative concerns.
Many years ago, when the modem Indian system of law was designed by the British
Raj, it primarily concerned itself with land tenure and aspects of criminal law . For the
British, it was also important that all customary entitlements should not be independently
pursued in their traditional forum; but be considered, adjudicated upon and pronounced
upon by British courts. This is what led to the administration of Hindu, Muslim and
other customary laws by judges of the Raj. And, of course, the judges were very selective
about the manner in which they defined and interpreted the law. They read-and misreadthe dharmasastra.
One of their own judges-I.H.
Nelson~omplained
that the
dharmasastra was not the customary law. But, it was easier to treat the dharmasastra as
the traditional law and practice itself; and, transform it to suit British purposes. So, what
was important to the Raj was land, criminal law and assimilation of traditional disputes
within its court system.
It was not long before an expanded view of law was felt to be necessary. The Indian
Penal Code was found in 1870 (ten years after its enactment) to be deficient because it did
not adequately deal with offences against the State. Sedition was added in 1870; and other
public law offences later. The Law Commissions appointed by the British during the 19th
Century were charged with a systematic expansion of the law. The purpose of this
expansion of the law was threefold; first, to ensure that all property and commercial
transactions were placed on a clear and 'modem' basis. The second was to leave the State
with sufficient armoury of powers to enforce law and order and check dissidence. And, the
third, to ensure that all disputes were routed through the law courts and legal processes
which were elaborately set up. Technically, it was the British with their compilation of
laws loosely called the Anglo-Indian Codes which sought to bring as much of society
under the law. It also sought to make society think of itself in the manner in which the
law had cast them.
Independent India-through
the Planning Commission and the Law Commissionbuilt on the edifice left behind by the British. But this expansion was made in the name
of socialism. Every aspect of the social life was sought to be covered by laws and
regulations of some kind or the other. Cultivation, production, manufacture, availability,
distribution, consumption and everything else. My point is in danger of being misunderstood if what I have said is taken as anything other than a descriptive statement. I
am not arguing for and against the system of regulatory control on licensing, manufacture
and distribution. On that, I have fairly strong views on the extent to which the economy
should be opened up to cater and a response to middle class consumption. I am just

/'
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speaking of the vast array of controls that exist. Some of the these are beneficial. There
are rules about banking enabling people to keep their money more securely in a bank
account Legislation covers the safety conditions under which people work. It covers the
guarantees that should be given to the consumer of faulty manufactured goods. It affords
minimum wages and provident funds. Legislation should provide for subsistence for
everyone in a country where Mahatma Gandhi rightly observed that often the only right of
a human being is the right to food. I am only making a descriptive statement that the law
is unavoidable. If the British sought to extend the law in the broad sense in which every
traditional promise was either a contract or not within the meaning of Indian Contract Act
1872, a vast array of legislation-both
before the primarily after Independence has since
infiltrated peoples' lives.
But, the infiltration has been much more extensive and unavoidable. A hundred years
ago to pursue an earlier example-all
agreements came within the purview of the
Contract Act, 1872; but the Contract Act, 1872 was not widely influential in altering
peoples' lives. The new set of laws changed the lives of people fundamentally. Farmers
who wished to better and expand their production needed to understand the regulations
under which they could .get a soft loan. When they wished to sell their products, they
would be guilty of blackmarketing if the rules laid down for the sale of food grains were
violated. Even the holding of a bank account entails walking into a maze of visible and
invisible controls. Alongside, lie problems about the ownership of land. Whether before
independence or now, disputes about land being disputes about legal title were routed
through law courts. Even today, disputes about land haunt us both within and without the
legal system. 'Often, such disputes are resolved by terrorizing the cultivators through
brutality, neglect and threat. But, legal title in rem (against the world) is an important
security. And every cultivator understands the importance of this part of the law. And,
those who are embroiled in title disputes know about these aspects of the law, however
poor or illiterate. They may be their knowledge may be limited to the pattas that they
own, the importance of the record operation or the sections under which their land is taken
away under the Forest Act. But, the knowledge is a part of their discourse of their
predicament
So, modem law has important constitutive and subsumptive effects. The constitutive
effect is to re-define us, our powers, relationships, agreements, entitlements, property
holdings and re-cost us into a new mould. The subsumptive effect is to seek-and, fairly
successfully-subsume
our lives within the constitutive framework of the law. Often, we
visualize ourselves through the lenses of the law with our lives and personalities recast in
legal categories. This happens unconsciously; as in the most well known examples of a
cheat being called a '420' without most people realizing that this colloquial description is
a reference to a provision of the Indian Penal Code.
But, let us return to the question of the avoidability of modem law. It may be argued
that although the law has been decreed, it does not really affect people who do not know
about it. This is certainly true of a large number of beneficial law . Most people do not
know of their benefits of and do not claim them. It is also true of some regulatory laws
which are simply ignored and not observed. Indeed, many issues concerning the law
simply lie fallow until someone uses them. Muslim's women right to maintenance as a
matter of right lay dormant until it was effectively raised. But it would be total fallacy to
argue that the legal system is avoidable simply because of imperfect knowledge about it.
It is not accident that the rich and advantaged have a greater knowledge of the legal system
than the poor and disadvantaged. In any event, many aspects of the legal system cannot be
avoided by the disadvantaged. A poor cultivator with some title to land knows he may be
able to get a loan. Where such title does not exist or imperfect, he is driven to the
moneylender, law courts and the police. But, most important of all, the poor and
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disadvantaged

find the legal system unavoidable

because

it is systematically

and

unsystematically used against them. Deprived of proper wages, hounded out of their
entitlements, harassed by the police (claiming to be used State authority, the legal system
arrives on their door step even if all they want is a poor but peaceful life). The legal
system is appropriated (whether by direct corruption or use) by the advantaged and used
against the disadvantaged. And, as it happens, the State is, often,-at the behest of forces
in civil society-an
ally in both the corrupt and legally valid use and abuse of laws
against the disadvantaged. The option of avoidance is pre-empted. The only question is
whether, and in what way, law should, and can, be made the situs of struggle.

4. Law as the situs of struggle
Talking about law as the situs of struggle has important practical implications.
Many activists believe that since the law is a net in which people get caught, the poor
and disadvantaged should avoid the law. They can only get caught within its labyrinth
from which they would never emerge. This view of the use of law ties in which an
experiential understanding of how the law has been used against the disadvantaged.
Functionaries of the law and legal processes do not live up to what even the law expects
of them. The police are known to be partial and brutal, administrators indifferent and,
often, corrupt and the legal processes slow, ineffective and cumbersome. To get trapped
into the law is, therefore, seen as a mistake.
The poor and disadvantaged are not just cautioned not to use law as an act of practical
wisdom; but as an act of faith. It is agreed that the use of the law entails involvement in,
and support for the legal system. It means, at least, a diversion of resources and energy
which would be better and more effectively spent in devising alternative strategies. Using
the law and legal system would create expectations and result-when
minor victories are
won-in inducing people to be co-opted into a partial fidelity to law and the use of the
legal system.
There is considerable force in both the cautionary warning about the use of law as
well as the ideological appeal that however, alluring liberal justice may appear to be, it
does not offer-Dr is able to offer-a substantive re-structuring of society. But several
arguments serve as counter-intuitives.
(i) Firstly, we have already explained that there is a limited extent to which people
can avoid the law. The law is not an option. It is an imposition. People do not just use
the law. They are made to use it. The political economy makes it mandatory for certain
aspects of the law to be used. For example, in order to acquire title to land certain
formalities have to be completed without which title cannot be obtained. Farmers seeking
loans from various banking agencies have to comply with certain formalities. But, there
is also another sense in which people are drawn into the law. This is as defendant. A poor
man falsely accused of a crime has no choice but to use the criminal process. Those
subjected to an abuse of the criminal process will continually be harassed by this abuse
unless they do something about it. The law is appropriated by powerful forces in civil
society and used against the disadvantaged.
(ii) Secondly, the law and legal institutions and processes-despite
their corruption
and systematic appropriation or abuse-have
some element of indeterminacy in them.
There are many examples of this. There are occasions and circumstances where poor
people have been graJlted bail, given interlocutory relief and protected from harassment.
No doubt this is not an everyday occurrence. If it were, the poor would have more cause
to have faith in the law.
Indeterminancy does not exist in the law because our rulers, and those who designed
our constitution and enacted the laws, are necessarily genuinely interested in the plight of
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the poor. But in order to get support for the system as a whole, it has to be shown to be
just. It is for this reason that the law is left indeterminate. The question is whether in any
legal system, this indeterminacy is, and can be, exploited by the disadvantaged in their
favour. Often, and in many cases, it cannot.
However, in recent years in India, an attempt has been made to try and prize open a
greater indeterminacy in Indian law. There is a considerable amount of cynicism as to why
the middle classes are fighting to make more of the system available to the poor and
disadvantaged. Some people say that some of the middle classes are doing this out of a
sense of self-aggrandizement. Others argue that the system is in a crisis-both,
in fact and
because it is losing legitimacy. It is trying to make itself more accessible to draw people
back to the system so that they can be exploited but without the intolerable and
unjustifiable oppression. In other words, this is an attempt to cloak exploitation and
make it appear more tolerable. Some concede that the middle class conscience has been
shocked; and, prodded into action. Others raise the more difficult question as to whether
there can be an alliance between the middle class-especially
lawyers and intellectualsand the genuinely poor and disadvantaged. All these are important insights make it
difficult to assess the permanent contribution of the social action litigation movement of
India law. This has not been a movement in the strict sense of the word although the
judges who have been at the forefront of it have tried to extend a systematic use of the
Supreme Court and High Courts. But there have been impressive gains. The higher
judiciary has become more accessible. Legal aid has not been adequately provided; but it is
an important aspects of public policy. It has also resulted in many groups and funding
agencies to examine legal aid needs; and devise new strategies. The judiciary is willing to
examine complicated social issues through fact finding commissions. They have gone
further and are willing to appoint Commissions to ensure that its orders have been carried
out. I do not want to sound too sanguine. These solutions have been imperfect. They may
not be permanent. On the other hand, they may be strengthened. And once strengthened
may provoke a counter-reaction from our rulers. This quest for solutions can only give
rise to very incomplete and half hearted confidence. Ev~n if they were more adequate and
substantial, their scope would be quite limited. An American observer Rick Abel
reflecting on the much more powerful public interest law movement in America said:
"Legal aid cannot be eliminated patriarchy within the family before or after divorce,
but it can alter the balance of power between men and women. It cannot transform
capitalist relations of production discipline the welfare state, it cannot eradicate pain
inflicted by the criminal process, but surely it mitigates that pain. It deserves our
critical support."
In the case of India, we have to wary-at times-of giving the social action movement
even critical support. But, we should not stand in the way of the system being prized
open to provide greater avenues. But the disadvantaged can always preserve their options.
If social action law; is a middle class sport, it does not mean that the disadvantaged have
to join it each time, except on their own terms, and seeking the kind of results they seek.
These judgements are never easy to make.
(iii) The third argument that has to be borne in mind is that the use of law does not
close options. Let me take a recent middle class example. The government enacted a
Defamation Bill. There was a national, middle class inspired campaign against it, with
support from various quarters. One strategy could have been to allow the Bill to be

ena(;tedj and, then, test its (;onstitutionality in coun. Nothing could have been more
foolish. The campaign succeeded. The poor and the disadvantaged are neither so well
resourced; nor, do they have the capacity to create so much support for their campaigns.
In most situations, the answer is to bring out confrontational social pressure in order to
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counteract oppression; or , to ensure that some advantage is gained. A andolan
always be seen as an effective first option.
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In more ways than one, one can only give qualified support of the law as the situs of
struggle. The natural constituency that the law seeks to serve are the advantaged, those
who seeks to preserve the status quo and those who wish to alter the status quo for their
benefit. But it cannot, either in form or substance, by wholly in favour of the advantaged.
The use of law as in instrument of social control rests on the assumption that the hw
will find a much wider acceptability than the interests of those who use it; and, whom it
eventually serves. In order to obtain this acceptability, it is couched in universal terms;
and, it must seek to provide access to those who are usually victims of it. This creates
indeterminacy; and, some room for the poor and disadvantaged to find turn around
solutions in the law. But the poor and disadvantaged have no option; because they are
drawn into legal processes out of no choice of their own. Law remains the situs of self
protection. Its indeterminacies can also be exploited as part of the wider struggle of the
disadvantaged without compromizing alternative strategies.

5. How do we go about it?
There are many who argue that socio-economic justice is not the direct concern of
law. The judiciary cannot arrogate the running of the country to itself; nor, it is argued,
should it be called up on to do so. The separation of powers carries with is separation of
functions. It is not for courts to assume the legislative and executive function to legislate
for and run the country. This argument leads to the conclusion tha~ it is for the
government to devise programmes, for the judiciary to ensure that the programmes stays
within its legal jurisdiction and for bureaucrats and activists to implement it. Earlier,
activists had a very limited role to play even though lip service was paid to their
involvement by of homage to Gandhian principles. Gradually, however, activists- have
been more uncompromizing about their role and function, seeing their primary duty
arising out of the needs of the community they are part of and serve, rather than as
ancilliary social workers assisting the success of government planning. No doubt in a
country like India where vulnerability exudes further and worse vulnerability, activists
must have a social agenda about their priorities. Law may play a role as one of the
strategies. But, our concern of using law and legal as the situs of struggle needs to be
looked at as a specialised part of the wider struggle of the disadvantaged for survival, and
substantive justice.
The simpler and easy solutions about the use of law were provided by the Krishna
Iyer (1973) and the Bhagwati-Krishna Iyer (1978) Committees on legal aid. While reciting
the usual invocations to voluntaryism, those committees concentrated in the main, on
two basis. The first was the usual planning committee model of creating under-resourced
committees in each district, each State and at the Centre. This hierarchical arrangements
was expected to deliver the goods. Once the committees were created, who would man
them? After all, law is practised in the private market economy of lawyering. How could
lawyers be induced to take on cases of the poor. This led to the second aspect of the
proposed plan. This consisted of an exhortation that lawyers should help the poor; and, in
inducement that they would be paid a small sum (that would otherwise be ridiculous even
when compared with the fee of even moderately competent lawyers). This plan was
doomed to fail. It depended on the government providing limited resources to create legal
aid committees; and, to top it all, expected lawyers to give up their work for a cause they
had to exhorted to belive in for a pittance.
This was-and
remains-a
poor imitation of legal aid systems elsewhere in the
world. They use an atomistic case-by-case legal aid approach. Effectively, faith and money
is put in lawyers pockets, and lawyers are supposed to do the rest. The faith cannot be
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treated seriously; and the money provided is simply not enough. Even if the money were
enough, there are problems with this routine legal aid approach. It -does not disclose a
strategy.
It is important to discuss this approach because it continues to remain the
philosophy underlying the National Legal Services Act, 1987. While I belive that Act to
be unconstitutional (because it permits judges to assume statutory authority, creates
courts of unlimited jurisdiction and unconstitutionally charges the Consolidated Fund of
the State), we are concerned here with its strategy on legal aid. With a budget of just
under Rs. 60 lakhs it is hardly likely to have enough resources to draw lawyers to take on
legal aid work. Some clients will be lucky; others, will simply either have to try their
luck or pave away their lives in obtaining legal assistance. This position will not be
fundamentally altered even if the State put more resources into the programme.
It is argued that the rich and advantaged use the legal system well because they house
the cumulative skills within well planned institutions to enable them to do so. The skills
of effectively using the legal system are not acquired over night, they have to be learnt
over a process in time and pulled together a continuing resource. The answer, therefore,
seems to lie in not proposing money for lawyers but resources for institutions which can
work with, and give support to, the cause of the disadvantaged. It is this essential
programme of Strategic legal aid that was proposed in my report to the Committee for the
Implementation
of Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS) in my report on Public Interest
Litigation in India; An Introductory
Report (1981). This report was only partly
implemented. Evidence of that lay in the Rural Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun which went
on to fight the case to stop mining in the Mussoorie hills.
Such Rural Entitlement Units were also created in others parts of U.P., Bihar and
Madhya Pradesh. But, the government gradually retreated back into an i1l resourced and
badly funded programme which is embodied in the National Legal Services Act, 1987. It
also sought to create new dispute settlement agencies called Lok Adalats to dispose of
petty cases which could be compromised.
But, meanwhile, the social action movement grew stronger and stronger. Yet, while
it contains a diversity of styles it carries a sense of incompleteness. Its strength draws
from the social action and involvement that sustains it. Its weakness dwells upon the lack
of available cumulated expertise.
But if strategic legal aid is to be developed in the from of institutionally competent
skilIs, how are these going to be created? The western solution has been to create
neighbourhood law centres on the assumption that the poor and disadvantaged would
appropriate these law centres to their own use. This solution has not wholly worked.
Reports from both England and America suggest that there is a vast turnover of staff in
these centres. Community links are developed but often fragile and shifting. Even in the
west, the stronger agencies have been those who have grown out of the community; or
sought to work with identifiable groups of people. At the same time, legal and strategic
expertise does not just come from grass root organizations and alliances but a net work of
support from specialist agencies who help to provide support and information.
In India, it was forgone conclusion that creating such centres would produce arid
results. This even more true of the committees that were envisaged by government. So,
the ansWer has laid creating legal capability within social action groups. This has not
been developed in-house; but, is-in the main-provided
by lawyers on the outside who,
for financial reasons, find themselves dividing their time between private practice and
their-in most cases-pro bono, or relatively, pro bono work.
A strategic and effective use of law is not really possible without adequate resources.
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If we want the disadvantaged and their legal activists to cumulate the same skills as the
advantaged, they must have the resources to do so. Unfortunately, India's tax system does
not permit the generation of too much support for legal activism. Till, recently, some
support as available from foreign foundations; but, there has been a general crackdown on
that as a source of resources. Strategic legal aid in India will either be starved of resources
or is destined to operate, partly in the private market and partly pro bono. And, as the
private market earns more and more attractive fees, it requires the very dedicated to provide
the kind of support and skills needed to develop legal strategies.
Finally, it is important to think about how we combine specialism with community
activism. No doubt, specialists will hijack the movement. In the course of time, the
community will find people and resources; but, this will take time. In the meanwhile,
there will be an uneasy-even
though not necessarily unproductive-relationship
between
activists without law and careerists lawyers without activism.

6. Exploited

and genocide sectors

of India's

political

economy

India has always had some difficulty in determining how it should count its
disadvantaged. The Constitution chose the easy way out. It listed members of Scheduled
Castes and Tribes who were earmarked for special attention. To these were added, the other
Backward Classes (OBCs). A great number of judicial decisions have tried to resolve how
the OBC's should be identified. And, the controversies continue.
Whatever the constitutional dispensation, we, too, have to identify disadvantaged in
order to determine priorities. In doing so, I am drawing on an earlier paper. entitled
"Managing Legal Activism; Reflecting on India's legal programme" (1984). A distinction
was made between those who were exploited (defined as those who are not paid their due
share; or what was due to them) and those who were not considered fit even for
exploitation. It was argued that beyond the exploited sector lies the redundancy sector,
those who were not even fit to exploit. Another name for the redundancy sector is the
genocide sector. The term is harsh, but not wholly inopposite. Those who have become
redundant are useless to the economy; and survive in the political economy because of the
balance of forces in their favour. In America, Red Indians were in the genocide sector. In
most societies, old people, on becoming redundant would be pushed into the genocide
sector, but for the fact that they retain some power or have created schemes to ensure
themselves from total vulnerability.
India, with its vast population and defenceless tribal, rural and urban poor does not
just have a large exploited sector. It also has a large genocide sector which is growing
everyday. This consists of people otherwise redundant to the mainstream economy and for
whom survival itself is assured by the courage of their social togetherness and political
will. It is in that area that there is unparalleled oppression. That is the primary arena of
struggle. The law has little to offer people in that sector of the political economy. Yet, it
may be able to playa role.

